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We provide evidence that ﬁrms with more transparent earnings enjoy a lower cost of
capital. We base our earnings transparency measure on the extent to which earnings and
change in earnings covary contemporaneously with returns. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative
relation between our transparency measure and subsequent excess and portfolio mean
returns, and expected cost of capital, even after controlling for previously documented
determinants of cost of capital.
& 2013 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license.1. Introduction
This study provides evidence that ﬁrms with more transparent earnings enjoy a lower cost of capital. Firms with more
transparent earnings are those whose earnings better reﬂect changes in the economic value of the ﬁrm. We operationalize
transparency by developing a measure based on the explanatory power of the returns-earnings relation, i.e., the extent to
which earnings and change in earnings covary contemporaneously with stock returns. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with more
transparent earnings have a lower cost of capital as reﬂected in subsequent excess returns and portfolio mean subsequent
returns. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms with more transparent earnings have a lower expected cost of capital. Our ﬁndings are based
on tests that include controls for growth and other ﬁrm fundamentals that are known to be associated with cost of capital.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) state that a
key purpose of ﬁnancial statements is to improve decision-making by investors, lenders, and other providers of capital. To
the extent that a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial statements, including its earnings, are more transparent, uncertainty regarding the value
of its equity may be lower, and therefore it will enjoy a lower cost of capital. Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), embraces this notion by suggesting that ‘‘high quality accounting standardsy
improve liquidity [and] reduce capital costs.’’1hud, Ryan Ball, Bill Beaver, Robert Bushman, Greg Clinch, Jennifer Conrad, S.P. Kothari (editor), Scott
us reviewer, and workshop participants at Louisiana State University, Tilburg University, Tsinghua
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M.E. Barth et al. / Journal of Accounting and Economics 55 (2013) 206–224 207We predict that earnings transparency is negatively associated with cost of capital. The basis for our prediction is the
well-established positive relation between information asymmetry and cost of capital and our expectation that earnings
transparency is negatively associated with information asymmetry. We expect a negative relation between earnings
transparency and information asymmetry because when earnings transparency is low, some investors will engage
in private information acquisition. Acquiring information about a ﬁrm’s economic value beyond that reﬂected in
earnings—which is low cost information about ﬁrm value—is costly. When this cost varies across investors, investors
will differ in the extent to which they acquire information, which contributes to information asymmetry. Also, information
asymmetry among investors can vary across ﬁrms such that it is negatively associated with transparency if investors’
marginal acquisition costs are higher when there is less information about ﬁrm value beyond that reﬂected in earnings.
However, ultimately it is an empirical question whether transparency is cross-sectionally negatively associated
with information asymmetry. To the extent that earnings transparency is not negatively associated with information
asymmetry, we will be unlikely to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relation between earnings transparency and cost of capital.2
We base our measure of earnings transparency on the explanatory power of the returns-earnings relation because the
relation measures the extent to which earnings captures changes in ﬁrm value. The intuition is that the higher is the
explanatory power, the more earnings captures changes in ﬁrm value. Although investors can obtain information about
changes in ﬁrm value from earnings or from other sources, our measure reﬂects only the extent to which earnings and
change in earnings, and information correlated with earnings and change in earnings, explain returns.
Because both earnings transparency and cost of capital can differ across ﬁrms and vary over time, we base our earnings
transparency measure on only current information and design the measure to permit cross-sectional and intertemporal
variation. We permit intertemporal variation in our measure by estimating annual returns-earnings relations because
there are several sources of intertemporal variation in earnings transparency that we expect to lead to economically
meaningful variation in the cost of capital. One source is changes in accounting standards. We permit cross-sectional
variation by exploiting industry and industry-neutral commonalities among ﬁrms in the returns-earnings relation,
where industry-neutral commonalities are commonalities unrelated to the ﬁrm’s primary industry. To exploit industry
commonalities, we estimate annual returns-earnings relations by industry. To exploit industry-neutral commonalities, we
estimate annual returns-earnings relations by quartile portfolios based on the residuals from the industry estimations.
These portfolio estimations capture cross-sectional differences in the returns-earnings relation that are not captured fully
by industry estimation. The portfolios are industry-neutral because each portfolio has the same industry composition. Our
earnings transparency measure for each ﬁrm-year is the sum of the explanatory powers from that ﬁrm-year’s returns-
earnings industry and industry-neutral relations.
Application of accounting standards can result in variation in the explanatory power of the returns-earnings relation
reﬂecting variation in earnings transparency as well as variation in ﬁrm fundamentals known to be related to cost of
capital. For example, earnings captures poorly changes in ﬁrm value for growth ﬁrms because changes in internally
generated intangible assets and growth options are not recognized in earnings. As a result, earnings of high growth ﬁrms
are not transparent and high growth ﬁrms will have low explanatory power in the returns-earnings relation. However,
growth is known to be associated with cost of capital regardless of whether earnings of high growth ﬁrms lack
transparency. As a result, variation in our earnings transparency measure is likely correlated with intertemporal changes
and cross-sectional differences in ﬁrm fundamentals such as growth. Therefore, detecting a relation between our earnings
transparency measure and cost of capital could be attributable to earnings transparency or such ﬁrm fundamentals. To
address this possibility, our tests include controls for growth and other ﬁrm fundamentals that are known to be associated
with cost of capital.
If greater earnings transparency is associated with lower cost of capital, we should observe a negative relation between
our earnings transparency measure and subsequent returns. We test whether this is the case using two approaches. The
ﬁrst tests for a relation between earnings transparency and subsequent excess returns, and the second tests for a relation
between earnings transparency and portfolio mean subsequent returns. In our excess returns tests, we estimate cross-
sectional relations between our earnings transparency measure and ﬁrms’ subsequent returns in excess of returns
predicted based on the Fama-French and momentum factors, which reﬂect known determinants of cost of capital. In our
portfolio mean returns tests, we sort ﬁrms into portfolios based on our earnings transparency measure and test whether,
after controlling for the Fama-French and momentum factors, mean returns are lower for higher transparency portfolios. If
greater earnings transparency is associated with lower cost of capital, we also should observe a negative relation between
our earnings transparency measure and a proxy for expected cost of capital. To test this, we estimate cross-sectional
relations between our measure of earnings transparency and a proxy for expected cost of capital based on the Fama-French
and momentum factors. We conduct our tests using a large sample of US ﬁrms over a 27-year period.
We ﬁnd that our earnings transparency measure is signiﬁcantly negatively related to subsequent excess and portfolio
mean returns, which indicates that earnings transparency explains subsequent returns incremental to the Fama-French
and momentum factors. We also ﬁnd that our earnings transparency measure is signiﬁcantly negatively related to our
proxy for expected cost of capital, which indicates that earnings transparency and the combination of the Fama-French and2 Section 5 provides evidence that our earnings transparency measure is negatively associated with measures of information asymmetry used in
prior research, which is consistent with the transparency measure reﬂecting intertemporal and cross-sectional variation in information asymmetry.
M.E. Barth et al. / Journal of Accounting and Economics 55 (2013) 206–224208momentum factors reﬂect common information. However, the expected cost of capital ﬁnding obtains regardless of
whether the fundamental risk characteristics underlying the factors are included in the estimating equation. This ﬁnding
indicates that earnings transparency reﬂects information associated with expected cost of capital incremental to that
reﬂected in these characteristics. Findings from all tests are robust to inclusion of explicit controls for leverage, growth,
and the magnitude of the earnings response coefﬁcient in the returns-earnings relation. In addition, ﬁndings relating to
subsequent excess and portfolio mean returns are robust to inclusion of controls for changes in cash ﬂow and cash ﬂow
risk, and ﬁndings relating to expected cost of capital are robust to using a measure of expected cost of capital implied by
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Collectively, these ﬁndings are consistent with greater earnings transparency being associated
with lower cost of capital.
Using a relevance measure bearing some resemblance to our earnings transparency measure, Francis et al. (2004)
reports evidence of negative relations between its measure and subsequent returns and a proxy for expected cost
of capital. Although Francis et al. (2004) and we have similar predictions regarding the negative association between
relevance/earnings transparency and cost of capital, the tests in Francis et al. (2004) do not support that study’s inferences.
The reported t-statistics in Francis et al. (2004) are biased upwards because the statistics do not take into account
correlation of regression residuals. We show that after taking into account such correlation, there is no signiﬁcant relation
between the Francis et al. (2004) measure and cost of capital. A key distinction between our study and Francis et al. (2004)
is that we develop an earnings transparency measure that is based only on current information, which likely accounts for
our ability to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation between earnings transparency and cost of capital.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the basis of our prediction and related research.
Section 3 explains why earnings transparency varies across ﬁrms and over time. Section 4 develops the research design,
Section 5 describes the sample, and Section 6 presents our results. Section 7 concludes the study.
2. Basis for prediction and related research
We predict that earnings transparency is negatively associated with cost of capital. There is an extensive literature
showing that information asymmetry is positively associated with cost of capital (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991).
Therefore, earnings transparency will be negatively associated with cost of capital if transparency is negatively associated
with information asymmetry. We expect that earnings transparency is negatively associated with information asymmetry
based on the following reasoning.
When earnings transparency is low, earnings—which is informative and available at little or no cost—does not capture
to a large extent changes in a ﬁrm’s economic value. This will lead some investors to engage in private information
acquisition. Acquiring information about a ﬁrm’s economic value beyond that reﬂected in earnings is costly. It is likely
that investors will differ in the extent to which they acquire information when there are differences in their marginal
acquisition costs, which contributes to information asymmetry.3 In addition, information asymmetry among investors can
vary across ﬁrms such that it is negatively associated with transparency if investors’ marginal acquisition costs are higher
when there is less information about ﬁrm value beyond that reﬂected in earnings. To the extent that information
asymmetry is not negatively associated with earnings transparency, we will be unlikely to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative
relation between earnings transparency and cost of capital. Section 5 reports empirical evidence that our transparency
measure is negatively associated with measures of information asymmetry used in prior research, which is consistent with
earnings transparency and information asymmetry being negatively related.
Although there is an extensive empirical literature linking various characteristics of accounting information to proxies
for equity cost of capital, with one exception, no study tests directly for a link between earnings transparency and cost of
capital. Accounting characteristics these studies examine include proxies for voluntary disclosure levels (Welker, 1995;
Botosan, 1997; Healy et al., 1999; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002), accruals quality (Francis et al.,
2005; Ecker et al., 2006), and various accounting-based and/or market-based measures of accounting quality (Bhattacharya
et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2004). Other studies provide empirical support for a link between quality of accounting
information and proxies for cost of debt capital (Sengupta, 1998; Beatty et al., 2002; Francis et al., 2005).4
Only Francis et al. (2004) examines the relation between cost of capital and a measure that bears some resemblance to
our earnings transparency measure. The measure is the adjusted R2 from a regression of returns on earnings and change in
earnings, which that study notes is adapted from the measure in an earlier version of our study.5 Francis et al. (2004) refers
to this measure as relevance, estimates it based on ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm time-series regressions using ten-year rolling windows of3 If information about ﬁrm value other than that reﬂected in earnings is available at little or no cost, it is possible that information asymmetry is low
regardless of the level of earnings transparency. If this is the case, there will be no relation between earnings transparency and cost of capital.
4 Although earnings quality and earnings transparency are likely related, ﬁrms with identical earnings quality can have different earnings
transparency. For example, consider two hypothetical software ﬁrms, MegaSoft and TinySoft, each of which has proportionately similar revenues,
expenses, and research and development costs, and each accounts for these items using US GAAP. Thus, the mapping from earnings to cash ﬂows is the
same for both ﬁrms and therefore the ﬁrms have the same earnings quality. Suppose information about MegaSoft’s earnings is adequate for investors to
have a clear understanding of valuation implications of earnings, but information about TinySoft’s earnings is not. That is, even though the mapping from
earnings to cash ﬂows is the same for both ﬁrms, the explanatory power between earnings and return is likely to be higher for MegaSoft.
5 Francis et al. (2004) deﬁnes transparency/relevance as the negative of adjusted R2. This sign convention is opposite to ours. We apply our sign
convention when discussing that study’s ﬁndings.
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and cost of capital using subsequent excess returns and a proxy for expected cost of capital. The study reports that the
relevance factor is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with subsequent returns and expected cost of capital. However,
Francis et al. (2004) bases its inferences on test statistics that do not take account of correlation of regression residuals.63. Variation in earnings transparency
Cost of capital can vary cross-sectionally and intertemporally (e.g., Fama and French, 1992, 1993; Campbell et al., 2001;
Xu and Malkiel, 2003). Variation in cost of capital can reﬂect differences in risk, including the risk arising from information
asymmetry associated with earnings transparency, which also can vary cross-sectionally and intertemporally. Only if
variation in earnings transparency reﬂects variation in information asymmetry will variation in earnings transparency
explain variation in cost of capital incremental to other known determinants of cost of capital.
There are several sources of cross-sectional variation in earnings transparency. First, earnings is not designed to reﬂect
all changes in economic value. For example, the accounting system is not designed to capture economic beneﬁts associated
with expected future contracts from current customer relationships. Second, the accounting system does not uniformly
measure earnings in a manner that reﬂects changes in economic value.7 Third, the way in which earnings maps into ﬁrm
value can differ across ﬁrms for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily directly related to accounting.8 Fourth, because
of differences in incentives managers face, ﬁrms differ in the amount of discretion their managers apply opportunistically.
Similarly, there are several sources of intertemporal variation in earnings transparency, which we expect to lead to
economically meaningful variation in the cost of capital. One source is changes in accounting standards. For example,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (SFAS 133, Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 1998)
requires recognition of derivative ﬁnancial instruments that affects earnings, but recognition of these instruments was not
required prior to SFAS 133. A second source is changes in the mix of a ﬁrm’s assets. For example, until recently many
insurance companies’ assets and liabilities related only to insurance policies, but recently these companies have
also invested in credit default swaps. As a result, insurance companies’ asset mix changed and so likely did their earnings
transparency. A third source is that, because of these changes or other reasons, e.g., changes in the clarity of ﬁrms’
disclosures, the mapping of earnings into ﬁrm value can differ over time. Because there is cross-sectional variation in
transparency, the effects of these intertemporal changes are likely to affect different ﬁrms differently.9
Because our sample comprises US ﬁrms, cross-sectional and intertemporal variations in transparency reﬂect effects of
exposure to the US ﬁnancial reporting system, which includes US GAAP, SEC regulation, and the US legal system. When a
ﬁrm commits to the US ﬁnancial reporting system, it commits to US reporting practices and changing practices when that
system changes or when the way in which the system applies to the ﬁrm changes, e.g., when its asset mix changes. All
aspects of the ﬁnancial reporting system evolve and affect ﬁrms differently, thereby contributing to intertemporal and
cross-sectional variation in earnings transparency.104. Research design
4.1. Earnings transparency measure
We operationalize earnings transparency by developing a measure based on the explanatory power of the returns-
earnings relation, i.e., the extent to which earnings and change in earnings covary contemporaneously with stock returns.
Regardless of the source of variation in earnings transparency, higher (lower) transparency will result in higher (lower)
explanatory power in the returns-earnings relation. Although investors can obtain information about changes in ﬁrm value
from earnings or from other sources, our measure reﬂects only the extent to which earnings and change in earnings, and
information correlated with earnings and change in earnings, explain returns.6 Section 6.3 discusses tests using the Francis et al. (2004) relevance measure that take into account residual correlation. Findings reveal the Francis
et al. (2004) relevance measure is not signiﬁcantly related to cost of capital.
7 Consider examples relating to fair value, pension, and oil and gas accounting. Firms with more assets measured at fair value could have higher
explanatory power in their contemporaneous returns-earnings relations than those with more assets measured at modiﬁed historical cost. The effects of
pension plan disclosures on transparency are likely to vary depending on whether a ﬁrm has deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans. Similarly, the effects of oil and
gas disclosures on transparency are relevant only to ﬁrms with oil and gas activities.
8 For example, ﬁrms may differ in the extent to which they convey information using conference calls or are covered by analysts.
9 Consider the example of SFAS 133, which requires derivatives to be recognized at fair value, with changes in fair value recognized in income or
other comprehensive income, and enhances derivatives disclosures. Application of SFAS 133 likely clariﬁes the valuation implications of bank earnings,
but not necessarily those of retail ﬁrms that have few derivatives. Thus, it is possible a retail ﬁrm and a bank can have different earnings transparency in
one year, e.g., before application of SFAS 133, but similar transparency in the next year, e.g., after application of SFAS 133.
10 Based on Kyle (1985) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) predicts that the relation between liquidity—a cost of
capital proxy—and disclosure should be stronger when a ﬁrm credibly commits to higher ﬁnancial reporting quality. Empirical studies testing this
prediction typically focus on a ﬁrm’s commitment to apply a set of accounting standards or a ﬁrm’s decision to cross-list its shares on a foreign stock
exchange (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Leuz, 2003; Daske et al., 2008). We do not focus on cost of capital effects associated with a commitment to
reporting quality because all sample ﬁrms are committed to the US ﬁnancial reporting system, including application of US GAAP.
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based on the relation between earnings and change in earnings deﬂated by price, E=P and DE=P, and contemporaneous
annual stock returns (Easton and Harris, 1991; Bushman et al., 2004). Appendix A, Section A.1, provides the details. We
interpret higher explanatory power in these returns-earnings regressions as indicating greater earnings transparency.
Valuation research establishes a link between equity book value and earnings and stock prices (Ohlson, 1995); earnings
and change in earnings are the amounts corresponding to equity book value and earnings when explaining stock returns
rather than stock prices.
We construct TRANS using a two-step estimation procedure designed to permit intertemporal and cross-sectional
variation in our earnings transparency measure. Our measure for each ﬁrm-year is the sum of the explanatory powers
from that ﬁrm-year’s returns-earnings relations estimated in the two steps.11 The ﬁrst R2 we use to construct TRANS is that
from annual returns-earnings relations estimated by industry. By construction, this component of TRANS is the same for
all ﬁrms for a given industry-year. There is a strong industry component to the returns-earnings relation as a result of
accounting practices likely being similar within industries (Barth et al., 1999, 2005). However, estimating the returns-
earnings relation by industry is not likely to capture fully differences across ﬁrms in the returns-earnings relation (Barth
et al., 2005). First, some accounting practices that affect the returns-earnings relation apply to ﬁrms in all industries.
Second, earnings can differ in the extent to which it reﬂects management’s information and thus changes in the economic
value of the ﬁrm. Third, identifying a ﬁrm’s industry is difﬁcult. Not only is the concept of industry not precisely deﬁned,
but also many ﬁrms operate in multiple industries.
The second R2 we use to construct TRANS is that from the annual returns-earnings relation estimated by portfolio,
where portfolio membership is based on the residuals from the industry regressions. As explained in Appendix A, there are
four portfolios for each year, where, for example, the ﬁrst portfolio is comprised of the quartile of observations from
each annual industry regression with the most negative residuals. Thus, the portfolio regressions capture cross-sectional
differences in the returns-earnings relation that are not captured fully by industry estimation. Also, the portfolios are
industry-neutral because each portfolio has the same industry composition. Thus, differences in the R2s from the portfolio
regressions cannot be attributed to differences in industry membership. This approach is analogous to that used in
Rouwenhorst (1998) in developing size- and country-neutral relative return portfolios.
If our grouping of ﬁrms into portfolios fails to reﬂect commonality in the returns-earnings relation among the ﬁrms
within each portfolio, then the R2s will be small. However, evidence in Table 2, Panel B, reveals substantial commonality
among ﬁrms in each portfolio. In particular, the mean R2s range from 17% to 42%, with a mean of 32%. All are substantially
larger than untabulated mean R2s from year-by-year regressions, 10%, and industry-by-industry regressions, 13%. The R2s
from our portfolio regressions are substantially higher than those reported in prior research (e.g., Lev, 1989).12
Our earnings transparency measure for ﬁrm i in year t, TRANSi,t , is the sum of the R
2s pertaining to ﬁrm i’s industry and
industry-neutral returns-earnings regressions in year t, which we label TRANSI and TRANSIN. Thus,
TRANSi,t  TRANSIj,tþTRANSINp,t , ð1Þ
where j and p denote industry and portfolio.
If cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in TRANS is not reﬂective of variation in earnings transparency, e.g., if
TRANS exhibits greater variation than earnings transparency, then basing our tests on TRANS will bias against detecting a
relation between earnings transparency and cost of capital. Basing our tests on TRANS will bias in favor of detecting a
relation between earnings transparency and cost of capital—even if none exists—if TRANS is correlated with other ﬁrm
fundamentals that determine cost of capital, such as growth. For example, earnings captures poorly changes in ﬁrm
value for growth ﬁrms because changes in internally generated intangible assets and growth options are not recognized
in earnings. As a result, earnings of high growth ﬁrms are not transparent and high growth ﬁrms will have low
TRANS. However, growth is known to be associated with cost of capital regardless of whether earnings of high growth
ﬁrms lack transparency. As a result, detecting a relation between TRANS and cost of capital could be attributable to earnings
transparency or growth because variation in TRANS is likely correlated with intertemporal changes and cross-sectional
differences in growth. Thus, as explained in Section 4.2, our tests relating TRANS to cost of capital include controls for known
risk factors, i.e., the Fama-French and momentum factors, that likely are associated with these ﬁrm fundamentals. In
addition, Section 6.4 reports that our inferences are unaffected by inclusion of an explicit control for growth.11 Ideally, we would like to construct a ﬁrm- and year-speciﬁc measure of earnings transparency. To construct a ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure, one could
estimate a time-series regression for each ﬁrm. However, such an approach does not permit intertemporal variation in earnings transparency. To
construct a year-speciﬁc measure, one could estimate a separate cross-sectional regression for each year. However, such an approach does not permit
cross-sectional variation in earnings transparency. To obtain an estimate of a ﬁrm’s earnings transparency, it is necessary to group ﬁrm-year observations
in some way. We use annual cross-sectional estimation and our grouping procedures to permit cross-sectional and intertemporal variation in earnings
transparency within the constraints imposed by empirical estimation.
12 Forming portfolios based on residuals from the industry regressions does not effectively group ﬁrms ex ante according to the magnitude of their
returns. First, although for our sample the untabulated cross-industry mean correlation between returns and residuals from the annual industry returns-
earnings regressions is 92%, the untabulated mean cross-portfolio correlation from the annual portfolio regressions is only 54%. Second, untabulated
ﬁndings from regressions based on portfolios explicitly ranked on returns reveal little explanatory power; the mean (across 27 years) adjusted R2 is only
4%. However, consistent with our predictions, grouping ﬁrms based on industry residuals groups ﬁrms with common risk characteristics as indicated by
untabulated mean ex post annual raw returns that increase monotonically across portfolios.
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We test for a relation between TRANS and cost of capital using excess and portfolio mean subsequent returns. Such tests
are commonly employed in the ﬁnance literature to determine whether posited risk factors are associated with cost of
capital by determining whether such factors explain subsequent returns incremental to the Fama-French and momentum
factors (e.g., Fama and French, 1993; Mohanram and Rajgopal, 2009; Konchitchki, 2011). The motivation for these tests is
that ﬁrm risk is more complex than is captured by the projection of returns on the Fama-French and momentum factor
returns. Evidence that a posited risk factor incrementally explains subsequent returns is viewed as evidence consistent
with the risk factor reﬂecting dimensions of cost of capital not captured by the Fama-French and momentum factors.
To test for a relation between earnings transparency and subsequent excess returns, we regress on TRANS the ﬁrm’s
subsequent return in excess of the ﬁrm’s predicted return based on the Fama-French and momentum factors. In particular,
we estimate the following equation:
FFRETi,tþ1 ¼ g0þg1TRANSi,tþg2DBTAi,tþ1þZi,tþ1, ð2Þ
where the subscripts i and t denote ﬁrm and year.
The dependent variable, FFRET , is an annualized excess return computed using compounded monthly returns. In
particular, FFRET for month m is the ﬁrm’s realized month m return in excess of the risk-free rate minus the ﬁrm’s
predicted return based on the Fama-French and momentum factor betas estimated using Eq. (A5) in Appendix A, each
multiplied by the month m realized factor returns. Thus, FFRET is the ﬁrm’s realized return minus its expected return,
conditional on the realized factor returns, assuming the ﬁrm’s factor betas do not change during year tþ1. To mitigate the
effects of error in estimating the betas, we treat as missing observations for which FFRET or the monthly compounded risk-
free rate adjusted annual return minus the predicted monthly compounded annual return from Eq. (A5) is less than 1.13
If greater earnings transparency is associated with lower cost of capital, we should observe a negative relation between
TRANS and subsequent excess returns. Thus, we predict g1 is negative.
14
We include DBTA, the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, in Eq. (2) to avoid bias in the coefﬁcient on TRANS resulting
from omission of DBTA if leverage is related to cost of capital. However, we make no prediction for the sign of its
coefﬁcient, g2.
15 We estimate Eq. (2) pooling observations cross-sectionally and over time, and by year. For the pooled
regression, we base tests statistics on residuals clustered by ﬁrm and including year ﬁxed effects (Petersen, 2009). For the
by-year regressions, following Fama and MacBeth (1973), we base test statistics on the mean and standard deviation of the
coefﬁcients.16
To test for a relation between earnings transparency and portfolio mean returns, we ﬁrst sort ﬁrms into one of ten
portfolios based on TRANS in month m1. Firms with the highest (lowest) TRANS are placed into portfolio ten (one). Then,
we estimate a regression, by portfolio, i.e., p¼ 1,. . .,10, of the value-weighted monthm portfolio return, Rp,m, on the month
m Fama-French and momentum factors:17
Rp,mRf ,m ¼ apþbRMRF,pðRM,mRf ,mÞþbSMB,pSMBmþbHML,pHMLmþbMOM,pMOMmþep,m: ð3Þ
ap is portfolio p’s mean realized return in excess of the risk-free rate conditional on the realized factor returns, permitting
portfolio p’s factor betas to be estimated contemporaneously with ap. If greater earnings transparency is associated with
lower cost of capital incremental to the Fama-French and momentum factors, we should observe a negative relation
between TRANS and the portfolio alphas (Fama and French, 1993). Thus, we predict a10 is less than a1. Because the
residuals likely are correlated across the ten portfolio regressions, we estimate the portfolio regressions using seemingly
unrelated regression (Zellner, 1962).18 An advantage of conducting portfolio mean returns tests is that the estimation
procedure permits factor betas, i.e., risk, to be estimated contemporaneously with returns.
By design, the factor betas in the portfolio mean returns tests reﬂect average risk over the estimation period. That is,
the sensitivity of portfolio mean returns for each of the ten TRANS-based portfolios is assumed to be the same over
the estimation period. This assumption differs from that associated with the excess returns tests, in which factor betas
for each ﬁrm are estimated over a shorter period—60 months—but are predetermined when estimating excess
returns. Because the tests rest on different assumptions regarding factor betas, ﬁnding consistent results for both tests13 These restrictions eliminate from the sample 323 ﬁrm-year observations.
14 Although use of subsequent excess returns to test for associations with cost of capital is common in empirical ﬁnance (e.g., Fama and French,
1997), doing so requires several assumptions, including rational expectations and stationarity of factor betas. If betas are not stationary, subsequent
excess returns can differ from zero because of changes in factor betas. As in prior research, we assume that any such changes only add noise to our tests.
Subsequent excess returns also can differ from zero because of new information and, thus, such tests can lack power and be biased if the new information
is correlated with TRANS. In Section 6.4, we report results from speciﬁcations of Eq. (2) that include controls for new information.
15 We also estimated Eq. (2) omitting DBTA. Inferences relating to TRANS are unaffected.
16 The Fama-MacBeth procedure is unaffected by cross-sectional correlation of residuals. Following Fama and French (1998), we do not attempt to
adjust the by-year estimations for correlation of residuals across years because it is unlikely that excess returns, and thus residuals, are serially
correlated.
17 Untabulated ﬁndings relating to equal-weighted portfolio returns result in similar inferences.
18 Although any remaining correlation between residuals for portfolios 1 and 10 could affect inferences from the test of whether a10 is less than a1,
untabulated Pearson and Spearman correlations are insigniﬁcant.
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To provide additional insights into the relation between earnings transparency and cost of capital, we also test whether
the betas estimated using Eq. (3) vary systematically across the TRANS portfolios. Determining whether and which betas
vary systematically reveals the factors with which TRANS is correlated. However, regardless of the pattern of the betas,
ﬁnding that the portfolio alphas vary across TRANS portfolios indicates that earnings transparency reﬂects dimensions of
cost of capital that the Fama-French and momentum factors do not.
4.3. Earnings transparency and expected cost of capital
We next test whether TRANS is negatively related to an estimate of expected cost of capital based on the Fama-French and
momentum four-factor model. Finding such a relation indicates that earnings transparency and a combination of the factors
reﬂect common information. The Fama-French model is an empirical factor-generating model and does not identify explicitly
which economic risks underlie the factors. Several studies attempt to identify these risks (e.g., Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001;
Petkova, 2006). Although these studies show that the factor returns appear to reﬂect empirically dimensions of risk identiﬁed
by asset pricing models, it remains an open question what dimensions of risk the factors represent. Thus, it is possible that
the factor returns reﬂect risk arising from information asymmetry (Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2007).
We test whether greater earnings transparency is associated with lower expected cost of capital by estimating the
following equation:
ECCi,t ¼ g0þg1TRANSi,tþg2DBTAi,tþg3MVEi,tþg4BMi,tþg5Betai,tþg6FFMomi,tþZi,t , ð4Þ
where ECCi,t is ﬁrm i’s expected cost of capital for year tþ1, based on information available as of the end of year t.19 If
greater earnings transparency is associated with lower expected cost of capital as measured by the four-factor model, we
should observe a negative relation between TRANS and ECC. Thus, we predict g1 is negative.
As Section A.2 of Appendix A explains, to obtain an estimate of expected cost of capital, we use the four-factor model,
with time-varying factor loadings, risk-free rates, and risk premia (Ang and Liu, 2004; Ibbotson Associates, 2005; Massa
et al., 2005). As with Eq. (2), we include DBTA in Eq. (4) to avoid bias in the coefﬁcient on TRANS that could result from
omission of DBTA.20
To provide evidence on the extent to which any correlation between TRANS and ECC is attributable to fundamental risk
characteristics identiﬁed in prior research, we estimate two versions of Eq. (4), one that excludes these characteristics, and
one that includes them. The fundamental characteristics are MVE, the natural logarithm of market value of equity; BM,
the equity book-to-market ratio; Beta, the CAPM beta; and FFMom, return momentum as implemented on the Fama and
French website, i.e., return over the ten months that end two months prior to ﬁscal year-end. Based on prior research, we
predict g3 and g4 are negative, and g5 and g6 are positive.
As with Eq. (2), we estimate Eq. (4) pooling observations cross-sectionally and over time, and by year. For the pooled
regression, we base tests statistics on residuals clustered by ﬁrm and year (Gow et al., 2010). For the by-year regressions,
we base test statistics on the mean and standard deviation of the coefﬁcients obtained from estimation of a seemingly
unrelated regression system of equations. We specify Eq. (4) with expected cost of capital as a function of earnings
transparency, and not vice versa. This is because although expected cost of capital can affect a ﬁrm’s future ﬁnancial
statement policy decisions and hence future earnings transparency, TRANS cannot be a function of expected cost of capital
because a ﬁrm’s current earnings transparency, TRANS, is known at the time investors assess the expected risk premium
for its stock.
Finding a negative relation between TRANS and ECC is evidence that TRANS captures dimensions of risk reﬂected in the
Fama-French and momentum factors. If so, g1 will be negative. If not, g1 will be insigniﬁcantly different from zero.
5. Sample and descriptive statistics
Our tests are based on a sample of US ﬁrms and 27 sample years, 1974–2000. Because construction of TRANS
requires earnings lagged one year and FFRET and ECC require return data for 60 prior months, we use some data for
years preceding 1974. To facilitate comparison of results, we restrict the sample period to be the same for all of our analyses.
The ﬁnal sample comprises 51,612 ﬁrm-year observations for 6,237 ﬁrms and reﬂects the data requirements described below.
To construct TRANS using Eqs. (A2) and (A3) in Appendix A, Section A.1, we obtain data from the CRSP Monthly Stock
File and the Compustat Industrial Annual databases. To mitigate the effects of outliers, following Easton and Harris (1991)
we treat as missing observations for which any of the earnings variables, Et=Pt1, Et1=Pt1, or DEt=Pt1, is not between
þ1.5 and 1.5. We also treat as missing observations for which annual return, RET , is in the extreme top and bottom
one percentile (Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995; Collins et al., 1997; Fama and French, 1998; Barth et al., 1999), and
observations with negative equity book value to avoid the ratio of long-term debt to total assets from exceeding 1. We also19 For expositional convenience, we use the same notation for coefﬁcients and error terms in Eqs. (2) and (4). In all likelihood they differ.
20 We also estimated Eq. (4) omitting DBTA. Inferences relating to TRANS are unaffected.
M.E. Barth et al. / Journal of Accounting and Economics 55 (2013) 206–224 213restrict the sample to observations with total assets and total revenue in excess of $10 million, and share price in excess of
$1. We use the industry classiﬁcations in Barth et al. (1998). If the industry component of TRANS, TRANSI, is negative in year
t, we set it to zero because negative explanatory power is not economically meaningful. To construct FFRET and ECC, we
obtain monthly returns from CRSP and the factor returns from the Fama-French database. We winsorize ECC to be between
0.0 and 0.5 because it is unlikely that any ﬁrm has a negative expected cost of capital or one in excess of 50%.21 DBTA is
constructed using data from the Compustat Industrial Annual database.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our estimating equations. Panel A presents overall
distributional statistics combining all industries and years, Panel B presents distributional statistics for each industry, and
Panel C presents Pearson and Spearman correlations. Panel A reveals TRANS averages 42% and ranges from 3% to 143%. The
industry statistics in Panel B indicate that this variation is attributable to both industry and industry-neutral differences.
For example, mean TRANSI (excluding Other) ranges from 9% for computers, insurance and real estate, pharmaceuticals,
services, and transportation to 17% for food. Panel A also indicates that expected cost of capital, ECC, also varies
considerably, with a mean of 0.16 and a standard deviation of 0.12.
Panels A and B indicate that the industry component of TRANS, TRANSI, is, on average, substantially smaller than the
industry-neutral component, TRANSIN. For the full sample, mean TRANSI is 11%, which is higher than the untabulated mean
of 10% from annual regressions pooling observations without partitioning by industry. Strikingly, mean TRANSIN is 31%,
which indicates that partitioning ﬁrm-year observations by the extent to which the industry speciﬁcation fails to explain
returns substantially improves the explanatory power of earnings and change in earnings. The means of both TRANSI and
TRANSIN are representative for ﬁrms in all 15 industries.
Table 1, Panel C, indicates that FFRET is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with TRANS based on the Pearson but not the
Spearman correlation.22 Similarly, the components of TRANS, TRANSI and TRANSIN, are signiﬁcantly negatively correlated
with FFRET based on the Pearson but not the Spearman correlation. ECC is signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with TRANS
and with each of its components. However, we test our predictions using the multivariate regression Eqs. (2), (3), and (4).
Table 1, Panel C, also indicates that ECC and FFRET are negatively correlated. ECC and FFRET need not be positively
correlated because ECC reﬂects dimensions of cost of capital captured by the Fama-French and momentum factors, and
FFRET reﬂects dimensions of cost of capital not captured by these factors.23 Panel C also indicates that DBTA is positively
correlated with ECC and negatively correlated with FFRET. These correlations are consistent with ECC, but not FFRET,
reﬂecting ﬁnancial risk as reﬂected in DBTA.
As an external validity check on TRANS as a proxy for earnings transparency, we calculate correlations between it and
ﬁve disclosure/transparency measures used in prior research. These are AIMR disclosure indices (e.g., Botosan, 1997) and
four S&P Ranking indices (Bailey et al., 2006).24 Untabulated ﬁndings indicate that Pearson (Spearman) correlations range
from 0.18 to 0.32 (0.16 to 0.33), all of which differ signiﬁcantly from zero.25 In addition, untabulated ﬁndings indicate that
each of these proxies is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with TRANSI and TRANSIN.
In addition, the economic intuition supporting a negative relation between TRANS and cost of capital depends on there
being a negative association between TRANS and information asymmetry. Thus, we also calculate correlations between
TRANS and ﬁve measures used in prior research reﬂecting information asymmetry: bid-ask spread (Brennan and
Subrahmanyam, 1996), arbitrage risk (Mendenhall, 2004), and accrual quality and two measures related to accrual
quality, the standard deviation of operating cash ﬂows and the proportion of loss years in the prior ten years (Dechow and
Dichev, 2002). We also use factor analysis to obtain a sixth information asymmetry measure based on the common
variation in the individual information asymmetry measures. Untabulated ﬁndings support a negative association between
TRANS and information asymmetry: Spearman (Pearson) correlations are signiﬁcantly negative for all six measures, and
range from 0.20 (0.18) for the information asymmetry factor to 0.08 (0.08) for the standard deviation of operating
cash ﬂows.26
Table 2, Panels A and B, presents summary statistics from estimating Eqs. (A2) and (A3) in Appendix A, which we use to
calculate TRANS. All statistics are based on 27 annual regressions. Panel A presents results for the industry regressions used21 We set to zero fewer than 10% of the TRANSI observations. We set to zero fewer than 12%, and set to 0.5 fewer than 5%, of the ECC observations.
Inferences from untabulated regressions in which we permit TRANSI to be negative and ECC to be negative or greater than 0.5 are identical to those from
the tabulated ﬁndings.
22 Throughout we use a ﬁve percent signiﬁcance level under a one-sided alternative when we have a signed prediction and under a two-sided
alternative otherwise.
23 FFRET also reﬂects differences between realized and expected returns arising from new information. See Section 6.4.
24 The four indices are: (1) the S&P Composite Ranking of ownership structure and investor rights, ﬁnancial transparency and information disclosure,
and board and management structure and processes; (2) the ﬁnancial transparency and information disclosure sub-ranking; (3) the S&P Composite
Ranking; and (4) the ﬁnancial transparency and information disclosure sub-ranking. (1) and (2) are based on information in annual reports, 10-Ks, and
proxy statements; (3) and (4) are based on information in annual reports.
25 Sample sizes used to compute the correlations are limited because of the availability of these alternative proxies. For the AIMR correlations, there
are 3,694 ﬁrm-year observations. We have 367 ﬁrms with S&P indices, which do not vary by year. Therefore, to correlate the S&P indices with TRANS, we
compute the average TRANS for the 367 ﬁrms with S&P indices and correlate that average with the S&P index.
26 Because TRANS and cost of capital reﬂect a common set of economic fundamentals, we also correlate the information asymmetry measures with
residuals from a regression of TRANS on the fundamentals we control for in Eqs. (2), (3), and (4)—leverage, size, the equity book-to-market ratio, beta, and
momentum—and residuals from a regression of TRANS on these fundamentals plus analysts’ growth forecasts that we control for in Section 6.4.2.
Untabulated ﬁndings reveal signiﬁcant negative associations between these two residual TRANS measures and all the information asymmetry measures.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Panel A: based on observations pooled across years and industries (N ¼51,612)
Mean Median Std. Max Min
TRANS 0.42 0.41 0.18 1.43 0.03
TRANSI 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.88 0.00
TRANSIN 0.31 0.31 0.14 0.63 0.03
FFRET 0.02 0.03 0.41 14.54 0.92
RET 0.19 0.13 0.49 13.43 0.94
Et=Pt1 0.09 0.09 0.14 1.50 1.48
DEt=Pt1 0.01 0.01 0.14 1.49 1.43
DBTA 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.97 0.00
ECC 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.50 0.00
Panel B: across-year means and standard deviations within each industry
TRANS TRANSI TRANSIN FFRET DBTA ECC
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Nobs
Chemicals 0.48 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.32 0.141 0.00 0.32 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.11 1,697
Computers 0.38 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.29 0.138 0.09 0.63 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.14 3,471
Durable manufacturers 0.42 0.17 0.11 0.05 0.32 0.140 0.00 0.40 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13 13,518
Extractive industries 0.41 0.17 0.10 0.08 0.32 0.140 0.00 0.37 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.11 2,111
Financial institutions 0.40 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.29 0.133 0.03 0.27 0.07 0.10 0.18 0.10 6,826
Food 0.49 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.32 0.140 0.06 0.45 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.10 1,633
Insurance, real estate 0.38 0.19 0.09 0.11 0.29 0.138 0.01 0.35 0.35 0.23 0.17 0.12 1,374
Mining, construction 0.43 0.20 0.11 0.11 0.31 0.141 0.03 0.42 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.13 1,255
Pharmaceuticals 0.38 0.21 0.09 0.13 0.29 0.142 0.19 1.03 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.11 1,050
Retail 0.42 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.31 0.138 0.02 0.41 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.12 5,179
services 0.40 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.31 0.137 0.04 0.45 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.13 2,790
Textiles, printing, publishing 0.46 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.32 0.138 0.01 0.32 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.12 4,169
Transportation 0.40 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.32 0.141 0.01 0.33 0.27 0.17 0.17 0.11 2,166
Utilities 0.43 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.32 0.137 0.01 0.20 0.33 0.09 0.14 0.07 4,239
Other 0.62 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.140 0.01 0.31 0.19 0.13 0.19 0.11 134
Total nobs 51,612
Panel C: correlations, pooling observations across years and industries. Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) diagonal.
TRANS TRANSI TRANSIN FFRET DBTA ECC
TRANS 1.000 0.624 0.902 0.006 0.037 0.110
TRANSI 0.673 1.000 0.276 0.015 0.003 0.043
TRANSIN 0.888 0.257 1.000 0.002 0.038 0.108
FFRET 0.038 0.022 0.036 1.000 0.057 0.042
DBTA 0.018 0.002 0.023 0.059 1.000 0.027
ECC 0.121 0.059 0.121 0.038 0.026 1.000
TRANS, earnings transparency, is the sum of the industry component, TRANSI, and the industry-neutral component, TRANSIN. TRANSI (TRANSIN) is the
adjusted R2 from annual regressions of returns, RET, for year t on earnings before discontinued operations and extraordinary items, deﬂated by lagged
price, Et=Pt1, and change in earnings, deﬂated by lagged price, DEt=Pt1, by industry as listed in Panel B (by portfolio based on the quartile of the residual
from the industry regressions). FFRET is an annualized excess return computed using compounded monthly returns. Excess return is the ﬁrm’s raw
return in excess of the risk-free rate minus the ﬁrm’s predicted return based on the Fama-French and momentum factor-mimicking portfolios, i.e., excess
market return, size, book-to-market, and momentum. All returns begin three months subsequent to the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year end. ECC is expected cost of
capital estimated based on the Fama-French and momentum factors. DBTA is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. All correlations in Panel C are
signiﬁcantly different from zero, except for the Spearman correlation between TRANS and its components and FFRET. Sample of US ﬁrms, 19742000.
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reveals that, on average, the R2 from the industry regressions, which is TRANSI, is at least 9%, and is somewhat higher than
that found in prior research (e.g., Easton and Harris, 1991).27 There is considerable cross-industry variation and cross-year
variation within each industry. The coefﬁcients on earnings and change in earnings, E=P and DE=P, also exhibit
considerable cross-industry variation and cross-year variation within each industry. However, the E=P ðDE=PÞ coefﬁcient
mean t-statistics indicate that it is signiﬁcantly positive for 6 (6) industries.
Table 2, Panel B, reveals that mean R2 from the portfolio regressions, which is mean TRANSIN, is substantially higher
than mean R2 from the industry regressions and those in prior research. TRANSIN ranges from 17% to 42%. This range27 The sample size in Table 2, Panels A and B, exceeds that of Table 1, Panel A, because we estimate Eqs. (A2) and (A3) with all available ﬁrm-year
observations. Construction of FFRET and missing data result in a smaller sample size for Eqs. (2) and (4).
Table 2
Summary statistics from regressions of annual returns on earnings and change in earnings. Means and standard deviations are across years.
Panel A: estimated by industry by year. RETi,j,t ¼ aI0þaI1Ei,j,t=Pi,j,t1þaI2DEi,j,t=Pi,j,t1þei,j,t
Intercept Et=Pt1 DEt=Pt1
Adj. R2¼TRANSI MeanCoefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Industry Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Nobs
Chemicals 0.12 0.15 1.96 3.02 0.54 1.07 1.02 1.87 1.09 1.53 1.91 1.94 0.16 0.16 69
Computers 0.22 0.39 2.98 4.49 0.53 0.80 1.57 1.62 0.80 1.10 1.98 1.49 0.11 0.11 149
Durable manufacturers 0.14 0.20 5.79 8.63 0.43 0.41 3.97 2.71 0.46 0.29 3.48 1.55 0.11 0.05 562
Extractive industries 0.16 0.30 2.05 7.12 0.20 0.65 1.00 1.96 0.58 0.78 1.39 1.75 0.10 0.08 89
Financial institutions 0.11 0.24 4.23 8.91 0.59 0.51 2.80 2.13 0.37 0.47 1.87 2.03 0.13 0.14 282
Food 0.11 0.13 1.62 2.04 0.84 0.85 1.81 1.67 0.89 1.18 1.56 1.65 0.17 0.18 67
Insurance, real estate 0.13 0.18 2.18 3.23 0.43 0.55 1.30 1.65 0.26 0.58 0.80 1.40 0.12 0.15 60
Mining, construction 0.10 0.25 0.85 3.37 0.48 0.64 1.18 1.41 0.32 0.54 0.90 1.37 0.12 0.11 54
Pharmaceuticals 0.20 0.31 1.92 2.71 0.56 1.31 0.61 1.25 1.26 2.13 0.97 1.39 0.11 0.16 45
Retail 0.12 0.17 3.39 4.09 0.63 0.46 2.93 1.88 0.33 0.36 1.59 1.75 0.12 0.06 219
Services 0.18 0.18 3.52 2.98 0.42 0.41 1.52 1.48 0.63 0.51 1.98 1.32 0.10 0.08 121
Textiles, printing, publishing 0.11 0.19 2.83 5.22 0.63 0.40 2.74 1.66 0.44 0.56 1.97 1.99 0.14 0.08 171
Transportation 0.16 0.19 2.99 3.63 0.33 0.42 1.24 1.32 0.42 0.62 1.26 1.49 0.09 0.08 91
Utilities 0.10 0.14 3.09 4.65 0.42 0.54 1.90 2.38 0.53 0.84 1.60 2.50 0.11 0.10 166
Other 0.08 0.15 0.97 1.33 1.00 1.08 1.19 1.23 0.35 2.02 0.46 1.48 0.30 0.26 7
Mean 0.14 0.21 2.69 4.36 0.54 0.67 1.79 1.75 0.58 0.90 1.58 1.67 0.13 0.12 144
Panel B: estimated by portfolio by year. Portfolio 1 (4) comprises ﬁrm-year observations with the most negative (positive) residuals from the industry regressions in Panel A.
RETi,p,t ¼ aIN0 þaIN1 Ei,p,t=Pi,p,t1þaIN2 DEi,p,t=Pi,p,t1þei,p,t
Intercept Et=Pt1 DEt=Pt1
Adj. R2¼TRANSIN MeanCoefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic Coefﬁcient t-statistic
Portfolio Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Nobs
1 0.22 0.13 30.25 20.03 0.48 0.24 9.55 4.03 0.30 0.19 6.54 4.25 0.30 0.08 533
2 0.00 0.15 3.41 24.13 0.49 0.31 10.86 5.80 0.38 0.23 8.24 4.46 0.42 0.12 540
3 0.19 0.18 23.26 19.84 0.42 0.32 8.98 5.64 0.42 0.25 7.91 3.97 0.39 0.13 544
4 0.65 0.30 29.46 10.13 0.10 0.62 1.67 3.40 0.83 0.49 5.65 2.21 0.17 0.09 537
Mean 0.15 0.19 4.77 18.53 0.37 0.37 7.77 4.72 0.48 0.29 7.08 3.72 0.32 0.10 538
Dependent variable is RET, return for year t, Et=Pt1 is earnings before discontinued operations and extraordinary items, deﬂated by lagged price, and D denotes annual change. i denotes ﬁrm, j denotes industry,
and p denotes portfolio. Sample is described in Table 1.
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M.E. Barth et al. / Journal of Accounting and Economics 55 (2013) 206–224216reﬂects substantial cross-portfolio variation. This high variation in TRANSIN and hence TRANS is important because
it helps to increase the power of our tests. The higher R2s reﬂect the higher t-statistics for the E=P and DE=P coefﬁcients
relative to those obtained from the industry regressions. These ﬁndings indicate that grouping ﬁrms into portfolios
based on the industry returns-earnings regression residuals successfully identiﬁes ﬁrms with common returns-earnings
relations.
Panels A and B also reveal how the industry and industry-neutral earnings and change in earnings coefﬁcients differ.
For example, for chemical ﬁrms, the mean coefﬁcients on earnings and change in earnings, aI1 and aI2, are 0.54 and 1.09.
Regardless of industry, ﬁrms in portfolio 1 have mean earnings and change in earnings coefﬁcients, aIN1 and aIN2 , of 0.48 and
0.30. The analogous coefﬁcients for ﬁrms in portfolio 4 are 0.10 and 0.83. This illustrates that assuming all chemical ﬁrms
have coefﬁcients of 0.54 and 1.09 imposes a binding constraint, and therefore does not fully reﬂect the explanatory power
of earnings and change in earnings for returns.
6. Results
6.1. Subsequent excess and portfolio mean returns
Table 3 presents summary statistics from estimating Eq. (2). The ﬁrst column contains statistics based on pooling
observations across industries and over time, and the next three columns contain statistics from by-year estimations.
Table 3 reveals, as predicted, a signiﬁcant negative relation between TRANS and subsequent excess returns. This ﬁnding
indicates that earnings transparency is negatively associated with cost of capital.28 The TRANS t-statistic from the pooled
regression is 2.73, and the Fama-MacBeth t-statistic from the by-year estimations is 1.96. The TRANS coefﬁcient is
0.04 for the pooled regression, and 0.05 on average across years. Evaluated at the mean of TRANS, 0.42, these ﬁndings
are consistent with a cost of capital that is 1.7% and 2.1% lower than for a ﬁrm with TRANS equal to zero. The coefﬁcient on
leverage, DBTA, is signiﬁcantly negative in both speciﬁcations.29
Table 4 presents ﬁndings from estimating Eq. (3) for each of the ten TRANS portfolios. Consistent with our predictions,
the Fama-French alpha declines from 0.0065 in portfolio 1 to 0.0000 in portfolio 10. In addition, untabulated ﬁndings from
a trend regression indicate that this decline is signiﬁcant (t-statistic¼1.95). Consistent with this trend, as the ﬁnal
column indicates, the difference in alphas for portfolios 10 and 1, 0.0065, is signiﬁcantly negative (w2-statistic¼9.96).
These ﬁndings indicate that ﬁrms with higher TRANS have lower Fama-French alphas and provide additional evidence that
earnings transparency is negatively associated with cost of capital.
Table 4 also indicates that the RMRF, SMB, and MOM (HML) coefﬁcients decrease (increase) from portfolio 1 to portfolio
10. For RMRF, the coefﬁcient difference between portfolios 10 and 1, 0.0423, is insigniﬁcantly different from zero
(w2-statistic¼0.77). The corresponding difference for MOM, 0.2000, is signiﬁcantly negative (w2-statistic¼17.57). The
decrease in the RMRF and MOM coefﬁcients is consistent with predictions in Lambert et al. (2007). The related differences
in HML and SMB coefﬁcients between portfolios 10 and 1, 0.2574 and 0.1621, are signiﬁcantly positive and negative
(w2-statistics ¼13.13 and 6.92). These ﬁndings indicate that the Fama-French and momentum factors and earnings
transparency reﬂect some common information about cost of capital. In particular, the Table 4 ﬁndings reveal that
earnings transparency is negatively related to the SMB andMOM factors, and positively related to the HML factor. However,
ﬁnding that the alphas vary across earnings transparency portfolios indicates that earnings transparency captures
dimensions of cost of capital that the Fama-French and momentum factors do not.30
6.2. Expected cost of capital
Table 5 presents summary statistics analogous to those in Table 3, but relating to Eq. (4). The ﬁrst (second) set of
columns presents ﬁndings excluding (including) the fundamental risk characteristics. Regarding the speciﬁcation that
excludes the fundamental risk characteristics, Table 5 reveals, as predicted, a signiﬁcant negative relation between
earnings transparency, TRANS, and expected cost of capital, ECC. The TRANS t-statistic from the pooled regression is 2.18,28 Finding a negative relation between TRANS and FFRET could be attributable to periods of greater correspondence between prices and earnings
being associated with lower cost of capital. That is, a negative relation could result from a temporal effect unrelated to earnings transparency. If this is the
case, then one would observe a negative correlation between annual averages of TRANS and annual averages of FFRET as well as expected cost of capital,
ECC. Untabulated ﬁndings based on annual means and medians reveal none of these correlations is signiﬁcant.
29 To assess whether the signiﬁcance of TRANS is attributable to its industry component, industry-neutral component, or both, we also estimate Eq.
(2) including TRANSI and TRANSIN in place of TRANS. Untabulated ﬁndings reveal that TRANSIN is negatively related to subsequent excess returns in both
estimations, but not signiﬁcantly so, and that TRANSI is signiﬁcantly negatively related to subsequent excess returns in both the pooled and by-year
estimations.
30 Our ﬁndings indicate that earnings transparency is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with subsequent returns, and therefore signiﬁcantly
negatively associated with cost of capital. These ﬁndings do not address whether earnings transparency is a priced risk factor. Untabulated ﬁndings from
implementing a Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach fail to support an inference that earnings transparency is a priced risk factor. However, this ﬁnding is
not surprising in light of prior research that implements similar tests and fails to support inferences that CAPM market beta, size, and momentum are
priced risk factors (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Jagannathan and Wang, 1996; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001; Fama and French, 2002; Cochran, 2005;
Petkova, 2006; Core et al., 2008).
Table 4
Summary statistics from portfolio regressions of monthly value-weighted portfolio excess returns on contemporaneous Fama-French and momentum
factors. Portfolios are formed based on earnings transparency.
Rp,mRf ,m ¼ apþbRMRF,pðRM,mRf ,mÞþbSMB,pSMBmþbHML,pHMLmþbMOM,pMOMmþep,m
Transparency portfolio (nobs¼334)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 101
ap 0.0065 0.0038 0.0014 0.0031 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0000 0.0065
t-statistic 4.46 1.91 1.02 2.27 0.55 0.51 0.36 0.69 1.12 0.00
w2-statistic 9.96
bRMRF 1.0202 1.0000 1.0397 1.0023 1.0403 0.9973 1.0469 0.9534 1.0094 0.9779 0.0423
t-statistic 29.96 21.56 32.04 32.01 27.63 30.31 31.57 28.48 32.34 27.21
w2-statistic 0.77
bSMB 0.0254 0.0155 0.0481 0.0497 0.0366 0.2428 0.0467 0.1240 0.0107 0.1875 0.1621
t-statistic 0.58 0.26 1.16 1.24 0.76 5.77 1.10 2.90 0.27 4.08
w2-statistic 6.92
bHML 0.0013 0.0273 0.0697 0.1787 0.0997 0.1228 0.4114 0.1284 0.3879 0.2587 0.2574
t-statistic 0.03 0.40 1.46 3.87 1.80 2.53 8.41 2.60 8.43 4.88
w2-statistic 13.13
bMOM 0.1277 0.2325 0.0170 0.1990 0.0443 0.0671 0.1109 0.1840 0.0931 0.0722 0.2000
t-statistic 3.79 5.06 0.53 6.42 1.19 2.06 3.38 5.55 3.01 2.03
w2-statistic 17.57
Adj. R2 0.78 0.66 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.77 0.71
In each month, m, we form ten portfolios based on TRANS; ﬁrms with the highest (lowest) TRANS are in portfolio ten (one). For each portfolio, using
seemingly unrelated regression (Zellner, 1962), we regress the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess returns, Rp,mRf ,m , on the three Fama-French
factors, ðRM,mRf ,mÞ, SMBm , and HMLm , and the momentum factor, MOMm. Portfolio value weights are based on equity market value at the beginning of
month m. TRANS, earnings transparency, is the sum of the industry component, TRANSI, and the industry-neutral component, TRANSIN. TRANSI (TRANSIN)
is the adjusted R2 from annual regressions of returns for year t on earnings before discontinued operations and extraordinary items, deﬂated by lagged
price, Et=Pt1, and change in earnings, deﬂated by lagged price, DEt=Pt1, by industry as listed in Table 1, Panel B (by portfolio based on the quartile of the
residual from the industry regressions). Sample is described in Table 1.
Table 3
Summary statistics from regression of subsequent returns on earnings transparency and control variables.
FFRETi,tþ1 ¼ g0þg1TRANSi,tþg2DBTAi,tþ1þZi,tþ1
By year
Pred Pooled Mean Std. FM-t
Intercept ? 0.17 0.06 0.08
t-statistic 13.55 1.70 2.44 3.52
TRANS  0.04 0.05 0.12
t-statistic 2.73 0.41 1.79 1.96
DBTA ? 0.15 0.14 0.12
t-statistic 12.41 2.47 2.02 6.17
Adj. R2 0.02 0.01 0.01
Nobs 51,612 1,912
FFRET is an annualized excess return computed using compounded monthly returns. Excess return is the ﬁrm’s raw return in excess of the risk-free rate
less the ﬁrm’s predicted return based on the Fama-French and momentum factor-mimicking portfolios, i.e., excess market return, size, book-to-market,
and momentum. All returns begin three months subsequent to the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year end. TRANS, earnings transparency, is the sum of the industry
component, TRANSI, and the industry-neutral component, TRANSIN. TRANSI (TRANSIN) is the adjusted R2 from annual regressions of returns for year t on
earnings before discontinued operations and extraordinary items, deﬂated by lagged price, Et=Pt1 , and change in earnings, deﬂated by lagged price,
DEt=Pt1, by industry as listed in Table 1, Panel B (by portfolio based on the quartile of the residual from the industry regressions). DBTA is the ratio of
long-term debt to total assets. Statistics from the pooled estimation are based on pooling observations cross-sectionally and over time, and clustering
residuals by ﬁrm and including year ﬁxed effects. Statistics from the by-year estimations include mean coefﬁcients and t-statistics, standard deviations of
the coefﬁcients and t-statistics, and Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistics. FM-t is the Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistic, i.e., the mean coefﬁcient across
years divided by the standard deviation of the mean. Sample is described in Table 1.
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regression and 0.03 on average across years. Evaluated at the mean of TRANS in Table 1, Panel A, 0.42, and using the
pooled (average across years) coefﬁcient, these ﬁndings are consistent with an expected cost of capital that is 3.36%
Table 5
Summary statistics from regressions of expected cost of capital on earnings transparency.
ECCi,t ¼ g0þg1TRANSi,tþg2DBTAi,tþg3MVEi,tþg4BMi,tþg5Betai,tþg6FFMomi,tþZi,t
By year By year
Pred Pooled Mean Std. FM-t Pooled Mean Std. FM-t
Intercept ? 0.19 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.17
t-statistic 11.35 21.34 8.93 9.59 4.79 10.77 12.09 4.15
TRANS  0.08 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.05
t-statistic 2.18 1.45 3.10 3.04 2.06 0.77 2.87 1.68
DBTA ? 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
t-statistic 1.67 2.10 2.44 4.33 2.05 2.05 2.84 4.02
MVE  0.01 0.01 0.02
t-statistic 1.69 3.45 14.31 2.09
BM  0.00 0.00 0.01
t-statistic 0.17 0.12 4.02 0.18
Beta þ 0.07 0.06 0.04
t-statistic 8.70 16.50 11.10 8.59
FFMom þ 0.03 0.03 0.03
t-statistic 2.20 4.48 4.74 5.22
Adj. R2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.26 0.11
Nobs 51,612 1,912 51,612 1,912
ECC is expected equity cost of capital for year tþ1 estimated using the Fama-French and momentum factors, based on information available at the end of
year t. TRANS, earnings transparency, is the sum of the industry component, TRANSI, and the industry-neutral component, TRANSIN. TRANSI (TRANSIN) is
the adjusted R2 from annual regressions of returns for year t on earnings before discontinued operations and extraordinary items, deﬂated by lagged
price, Et=Pt1, and change in earnings, deﬂated by lagged price, DEt=Pt1, by industry as listed in Table 1, Panel B (by portfolio based on the quartile of the
residual from the industry regressions). DBTA is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. MVE is the natural logarithm of market value of equity, BM is
the equity book-to-market ratio, Beta is the CAPM beta, and FFMom is return momentum, i.e., following Fama and French, return over the ten months that
end two months prior to ﬁscal year-end. Statistics from the pooled estimation are based on pooling observations cross-sectionally and over time, and
clustering residuals by ﬁrm and year. Statistics from the by-year estimations include mean coefﬁcients and t-statistics, standard deviations of the
coefﬁcients and t-statistics, and Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistics. FM-t is the Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistic, i.e., the mean coefﬁcient across years
divided by the standard deviation of the mean. Sample is described in Table 1.
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positive in the pooled and by-year estimations.31,32
Regarding the speciﬁcation that includes the fundamental risk characteristics, ﬁndings from the pooled and by-year
Fama-MacBeth estimations reveal that three of the four coefﬁcients on the fundamental risk variables are signiﬁcantly
different from zero with predicted signs. More importantly, the ﬁndings reveal that the coefﬁcient on TRANS is signiﬁcantly
negative (t-statistics¼2.06 and 1.68 in the pooled and Fama-MacBeth estimations). The lower signiﬁcance level for the
TRANS coefﬁcient when fundamental risk characteristics are included in the estimating equation suggests that TRANS is
correlated with them. Thus, consistent with the ﬁndings in Table 4 relating to the portfolio betas, these ﬁndings indicate
that the fundamental risk characteristics and earnings transparency reﬂect some common information about cost of
capital. However, ﬁnding that the TRANS coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly negative when the risk characteristics are included in
the estimating equation indicates that TRANS reﬂects information associated with ECC incremental to that reﬂected in
these characteristics.6.3. Francis et al. (2004)
Using a value relevance measure that bears some resemblance to our earnings transparency measure, Francis et al.
(2004) reports evidence of a negative relation between that study’s relevance measure and subsequent returns
incremental to the three Fama-French factors, and a proxy for expected cost of capital.33 However, as we establish below,
had Francis et al. (2004) reported correctly calculated test statistics, those statistics would have revealed an insigniﬁcant
relation between that study’s relevance measure and cost of capital.31 The R2s in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation in Table 5 appear low relative to those in prior research, e.g., Francis et al. (2004). However, the speciﬁcation
includes only TRANS and DBTA; ECC comprises the Fama-French and momentum factors, weighted by their betas. Thus, the R2 only reﬂects the
incremental effect associated with the two explanatory variables. Typically, prior research, e.g., Francis et al. (2004), includes the factors as additional
explanatory variables, thereby increasing the R2, as does the other speciﬁcation in Table 5. This same observation applies to Tables 3 and 4.
32 To assess whether the signiﬁcance of TRANS is attributable to its industry component, industry-neutral component, or both, we estimate Eq. (4)
including TRANSI and TRANSIN in place of TRANS. Untabulated ﬁndings reveal TRANSIN (TRANSI) is signiﬁcantly negatively (insigniﬁcantly) related to ECC
in both estimations.
33 We apply our sign convention when discussing the Francis et al. (2004) ﬁndings (see footnote 5).
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regressions using ten-year rolling windows. Francis et al. (2004) uses its relevance measure and a factor return constructed
from the measure to test for an association between relevance and cost of capital. Using subsequent returns as a measure
of cost of capital, Francis et al. (2004) forms factor-mimicking portfolios based on its relevance measure to obtain factor
returns for inclusion as an additional factor in ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm time-series regressions of returns on the three Fama-French
factors, and estimates each ﬁrm’s return sensitivity to the three Fama-French and the relevance factor returns. Using
expected cost of capital implied by a model that incorporates analysts’ earnings forecasts, Francis et al. (2004) estimates
annual cross-sectional regressions of expected cost of capital on its relevance measure.
Francis et al. (2004) bases its inference from its subsequent returns tests on aggregated statistics from time-series
regressions, and assesses signiﬁcance of the relevance factor by implementing the Fama and MacBeth (1973) aggregation
procedure to the time-series regression estimates. When aggregating estimates in the subsequent return tests, Francis
et al. (2004) fails to adjust the resulting test statistics for cross-sectional correlation of residuals that results from the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc coefﬁcient estimates being based on observations from overlapping time periods (Schipper and Thompson, 1983).
Francis et al. (2004) bases its inference from its expected cost of capital tests on aggregated statistics from year-by-year
cross-sectional regressions, and assesses signiﬁcance of the relevance measure by implementing the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) aggregation procedure to the regression estimates. When aggregating estimates in the expected cost of capital
tests, Francis et al. (2004) fails to adjust the resulting test statistics for intertemporal correlation of residuals.
We use two approaches to establish that the inference in Francis et al. (2004) that its relevance measure is negatively related
to cost of capital is unfounded. First, we implement tests relating to returns analogous to those in Francis et al. (2004), taking into
account cross-sectional correlation of residuals. We test whether returns on a factor-mimicking portfolio based on the Francis
et al. (2004) relevance factor are signiﬁcantly positively related to returns incremental to the Fama-French factors in portfolio-
and ﬁrm-level tests. Untabulated ﬁndings from both tests reveal that the Francis et al. (2004) relevance factor return beta is
insigniﬁcant. The adjusted Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistics corresponding to the portfolio- and ﬁrm-level tests are 0.75
and 0.50.34 These ﬁndings indicate that after controlling for cross-sectional correlation of residuals, the Francis et al. (2004)
relevance factor return is not signiﬁcantly associated with returns incremental to the three Fama-French factors.35 We also test
whether the Francis et al. (2004) relevance measure is signiﬁcantly negatively related to that study’s expected cost of capital
proxy. Untabulated ﬁndings reveal that it is not (t-statistic¼0.77).
Second, we implement our tests to determine whether the Francis et al. (2004) relevance measure is signiﬁcantly negatively
related to subsequent excess and portfolio mean returns, and expected cost of capital. Untabulated ﬁndings relating to Eq. (2)
indicate that the relevance measure is not signiﬁcantly negatively related to subsequent excess returns. The pooled regression t-
statistic is 0.68, and the Fama-MacBeth t-statistic from the year-by-year estimations is 0.13. Untabulated ﬁndings relating to
Eq. (3) indicate that the alphas for portfolios 1 and 10 are insigniﬁcantly different (w2-statistic¼0.89). Untabulated ﬁndings
relating to Eq. (4) indicate that the Francis et al. (2004) relevance measure is not signiﬁcantly negatively related to our measure
of expected cost of capital (t-statistics¼0.55 and 0.84 in the pooled and year-by-year estimations).
The apparent similarity between the Francis et al. (2004) relevance measure and our earnings transparency measure
raises the question of why there is a signiﬁcant negative relation between cost of capital and our earnings transparency
measure but not the Francis et al. (2004) measure. To begin, the apparent similarity is false. Untabulated Pearson and
Spearman correlations between the Francis et al. (2004) relevance measure and TRANS are both 0.02, and insigniﬁcantly
different from zero. This lack of correlation is not surprising because the Francis et al. (2004) relevance measure is based on
ten years of past data. As a result, the measure reﬂects dated information and exhibits essentially no intertemporal
variation. In contrast, we construct TRANS using current data and permit it to vary intertemporally.
6.4. Alternative speciﬁcations
We consider alternative speciﬁcations of Eqs. (2) and (4) to assess the robustness of our inferences about the relation
between earnings transparency and subsequent excess returns and expected cost of capital. Findings from these
alternative speciﬁcations do not alter the inferences we draw from our primary ﬁndings.
6.4.1. New information in subsequent returns
Subsequent excess returns can differ from expected returns because of new information or if the four-factor model does
not fully control for expected return. As a result, subsequent excess returns tests can lack power and can be biased if the34 Inferences from both the portfolio- and ﬁrm-level tests regarding signiﬁcance of the Francis et al. (2004) relevance factor are unaffected by
including a momentum factor return.
35 Ecker et al. (2006) extends Francis et al. (2004) by showing that the loadings on a factor return based on a measure of accruals quality are
correlated with proxies for earnings quality, including the Francis et al. (2004) relevance measure. This raises the possibility that accruals quality and
transparency could be correlated and, therefore, reﬂect similar information insofar as explaining cross-sectional variation in returns. However,
untabulated ﬁndings reveal that the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between TRANS and the Ecker et al. (2006) accruals quality measure is signiﬁcant
and negative, 0.15 (0.16). In addition, untabulated ﬁndings from estimating the portfolio- and ﬁrm-level regressions of excess returns on the returns
to the Fama-French factors and the Ecker et al. (2006) accruals quality factor, using the same estimation approach as described above relating to Francis
et al. (2004), reveal that the accruals quality factor return is insigniﬁcantly associated with returns incremental to the Fama-French factor returns. The
adjusted Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistics corresponding to the portfolio- and ﬁrm-level tests are 0.16 and 0.52.
M.E. Barth et al. / Journal of Accounting and Economics 55 (2013) 206–224220new information or an omitted risk factor is correlated with TRANS (Elton, 1999; Vuolteenaho, 2002; Easton and Monahan,
2005). In particular, new information can alter investors’ expectations of future cash ﬂow. We include two measures of
information about expected future cash ﬂow as additional variables in our subsequent excess returns tests: change in
operating cash ﬂow (Minton and Schrand, 1999) and an indicator variable for whether earnings is negative. Change in
operating cash ﬂow, DCFO, is the difference between year tþ1 and year t operating cash ﬂow, CFO, deﬂated by total assets
at the end of year t, where CFO is the annual equivalent to the quarterly CFO.36 We set the negative earnings indicator
variable, NEG, equal to one if earnings in year tþ1, i.e., Etþ1, is negative and zero otherwise. Regarding a potential omitted
risk factor, we include the coefﬁcient of variation in cash ﬂow as a control for cash ﬂow risk (Minton and Schrand, 1999).
The coefﬁcient of variation in cash ﬂow, CVCF, is the coefﬁcient of variation in a ﬁrm’s quarterly operating cash ﬂow over
the six-year period preceding each sample year minus the median coefﬁcient of variation in cash ﬂow for ﬁrms in the same
two-digit SIC code.
Table 6 reports ﬁndings from speciﬁcations of Eq. (2) supplemented with combinations of each of the additional
variables, NEG, DCFO, and CVCF. For the sake of parsimony, we tabulate only coefﬁcients and test statistics corresponding
to TRANS. Although untabulated ﬁndings indicate that the coefﬁcients on NEG, DCFO, and CVCF are often signiﬁcantly
different from zero, the key result presented in Panel A is that in all speciﬁcations the coefﬁcient on TRANS is signiﬁcantly
negative in both the pooled and by-year estimations. These ﬁndings indicate that our inferences relating to TRANS from the
ﬁndings in Table 3 are unaffected by inclusion of controls for new information about expected future cash ﬂow and cash
ﬂow risk.
6.4.2. Correlation between TRANS and growth
Because earnings of high growth ﬁrms are more likely to omit information about changes in future revenues and
expenses, high growth ﬁrms have lower earnings transparency and lower R2s in the returns-earnings relation, i.e., lower
values of TRANS. However, this omission also results in TRANS being correlated with a ﬁrm’s investment proﬁle, which
could confound our inferences that earnings transparency is related to cost of capital. To the extent that high growth ﬁrms
are riskier, they will have higher costs of capital. As a result, TRANS could be negatively related to cost of capital solely
because of the negative correlation between TRANS and growth.37 To the extent that the Fama-French and momentum
factors reﬂect dimensions of growth (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001; Petkova, 2006), Eqs. (2), (3), and (4) implicitly control for
the effect of growth on cost of capital. Thus, our ﬁnding a signiﬁcant relation between TRANS and cost of capital in these
equations cannot be attributed to growth as reﬂected in these factors. However, because the Fama-French and momentum
factors may not reﬂect fully all dimensions of growth, we also estimate Eqs. (2), (3), and (4) including analysts’ long-term
earnings growth forecasts as an explicit proxy for growth. Untabulated ﬁndings reveal that although the growth proxy’s
coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from zero in some speciﬁcations, the TRANS coefﬁcient remains signiﬁcantly negative.
Thus, our inferences regarding the relation between earnings transparency and cost of capital are unchanged when we
include an explicit proxy for growth.38
6.4.3. Correlation between TRANS and earnings response coefﬁcients
Earnings response coefﬁcients (ERCs) are positively correlated with model explanatory power (Johnston, 1984;
Collins and Kothari, 1989; Kothari, 2001). Because TRANS is the sum of R2s from two returns-earnings regressions, a
positive correlation between ERCs and the R2s from our regressions is a potential confounding factor or alternative
explanation for our ﬁnding a negative relation between TRANS and cost of capital. A higher ERC is consistent with a lower
cost of capital (Collins and Kothari, 1989). Therefore, ﬁnding that higher TRANS is associated with lower cost of capital
could be a result of a positive correlation between TRANS and ERCs. For our sample, ERCs and R2s are positively correlated.
For example, focusing on the ERC for earnings, the correlation between ERC and R2 from the ﬁrst-stage (second-stage)
regression is 0.40 (0.52). The analogous correlation between TRANS and the ERC is 0.34 (0.49). To mitigate the possibility
that the correlation between TRANS and ERCs affects our inferences, we estimate Eqs. (2), (3), and (4) alternatively
including the average of the ERCs from the two stages, and the ERC from each stage. Untabulated ﬁndings relating to all
three speciﬁcations of each equation reveal our inferences regarding the relation between TRANS and cost of capital are
unchanged.
6.4.4. Implied expected cost of capital
Our proxy for expected cost of capital used in estimation of Eq. (4) is based on the four-factor model. Use of the model
assumes that the four factors reﬂect all dimensions of risk. Our ﬁndings in Table 3 indicate that this assumption may not36 Quarterly CFO is sales minus the sum of cost of goods sold, selling, general, and administrative expenses, and the change in working capital.
Working capital is current assets other than cash and short-term investments minus current liabilities, and is calculated as the sum of accounts
receivable, inventory, and other current assets minus the sum of accounts payable, income taxes payable, and other current liabilities. Quarterly selling,
general, and administrative expenses exclude one-quarter of annual research and development costs and advertising expenses when those data items are
available.
37 Although some prior studies suggest that growth is positively related to cost of capital, others suggest it is negatively correlated (e.g., Fama and
French, 1992). See Zhang (2005) for further discussion.
38 It is possible that using alternative growth proxies or speciﬁcations could result in different inferences.
Table 6
Summary statistics from alternative speciﬁcations of the regression of subsequent excess returns on earnings transparency.
Model 1 : FFRETi,tþ1 ¼ g0þg1TRANSi,tþg2DBTAi,tþ1þg3NEGi,tþ1þZi,tþ1
Model 2 : FFRETi,tþ1 ¼ g0þg1TRANSi,tþg2DBTAi,tþ1þg3DOCFi,tþ1þZi,tþ1
Model 3 : FFRETi,tþ1 ¼ g0þg1TRANSi,tþg2DBTAi,tþ1þg3CVCFi,tþ1þZi,tþ1
Model 4 : FFRETi,tþ1 ¼ g0þg1TRANSi,tþg2DBTAi,tþ1þg3NEGi,tþ1þg4DOCFi,tþ1þZi,tþ1
Model 5 : FFRETi,tþ1 ¼ g0þg1TRANSi,tþg2DBTAi,tþ1þg3NEGi,tþ1þg4CVCFi,tþ1þZi,tþ1
Model 6 : FFRETi,tþ1 ¼ g0þg1TRANSi,tþg2DBTAi,tþ1þg3DOCFi,tþ1þg4CVCFi,tþ1þZi,tþ1
Model 7 : FFRETi,tþ1 ¼ g0þg1TRANSi,tþg2DBTAi,tþ1þg3NEGi,tþ1þg4DOCFi,tþ1þg5CVCFi,tþ1þZi,tþ1
Pooled By Year
Pred Coef. R2 Nobs Mean Coef. Std. FM-t Mean R2
Model 1: TRANS  0.04 0.04 51,612 0.04 0.11 0.04
t-statistic 2.83 0.43 1.73 2.04
Model 2: TRANS  0.06 0.03 33,875 0.05 0.15 0.07
t-statistic 3.29 0.54 1.56 1.80
Model 3: TRANS  0.07 0.02 33,967 0.11 0.25 0.02
t-statistic 3.53 0.60 1.62 2.35
Model 4: TRANS  0.06 0.05 33,875 0.05 0.14 0.07
t-statistic 3.49 0.57 1.43 7.70
Model 5: TRANS  0.07 0.04 33,967 0.11 0.24 0.06
t-statistic 3.71 0.63 1.50 7.92
Model 6: TRANS  0.06 0.03 33,875 0.09 0.22 0.05
t-statistic 3.29 0.53 1.56 2.24
Model 7: TRANS  0.06 0.05 33,875 0.09 0.21 0.08
t-statistic 3.49 0.57 1.44 2.29
FFRET is an annualized excess return computed using compounded monthly returns. Excess return is the ﬁrm’s raw return in excess of the risk-free rate
less the ﬁrm’s predicted return based on the Fama-French and momentum factor-mimicking portfolios, i.e., excess market return, size, book-to-market,
and momentum. All returns begin three months subsequent to the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year end. TRANS, earnings transparency, is the sum of the industry
component, TRANSI, and the industry-neutral component, TRANSIN. TRANSI (TRANSIN) is the adjusted R2 from annual regressions of returns for year t on
earnings before discontinued operations and extraordinary items, deﬂated by lagged price, Et=Pt1, and change in earnings, deﬂated by lagged price,
DEt=Pt1, by industry as listed in Table 1, Panel B (by portfolio based on the quartile of the residual from the industry regressions). DBTA is the ratio of
long-term debt to total assets. NEG is an indicator variable that equals 1 if Et is negative, and 0 otherwise. DOCF is annual change in realized operating
cash ﬂow, deﬁned as the difference between one-year ahead and current year OCF, deﬂated by current year total assets. Current year OCF is the annual
equivalent to the quarterly OCF deﬁned in Minton and Schrand (1999). CVCF is the coefﬁcient of variation in cash ﬂow, deﬁned following Minton and
Schrand (1999) as the coefﬁcient of variation in a ﬁrm’s quarterly operating cash ﬂow over the six-year period preceding each sample year. Statistics from
the pooled estimation are based on pooling observations cross-sectionally and over time, and clustering residuals by ﬁrm and including year ﬁxed effects.
Statistics from the by-year estimations include mean coefﬁcients and t-statistics, standard deviations of the coefﬁcients and t-statistics, and Fama and
MacBeth (1973) t-statistics. FM-t is the Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistic, i.e., the mean coefﬁcient across years divided by the standard deviation of the
mean. Sample is described in Table 1.
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analysts’ earnings forecasts. Studies that adopt this approach, including Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001),
Gode and Mohanram (2003), and Easton (2004), develop somewhat different implied expected cost of capital measures.
Therefore, to assess the robustness of our ﬁndings in Table 5, we estimate Eq. (4) using the mean of the several measures of
implied expected cost of capital (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Dhaliwal et al., 2007; Barth et al., 2008). Also, because Gode and
Mohanram (2008) and McInnis (2010) ﬁnd that estimates of implied expected cost of capital reﬂect bias in analysts’
forecasts, we use the procedure in Gode and Mohanram (2008) to correct the implied expected cost of capital measures for
analysts’ forecast bias. Untabulated ﬁndings reveal that TRANS is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with the mean implied
expected cost of capital measure, with a t-statistic of 2.33. Additional untabulated ﬁndings reveal that TRANS is
signiﬁcantly negatively associated with each of the four component measures.7. Conclusion
This study examines whether ﬁrms with more transparent earnings enjoy a lower cost of capital. We base our measure
of earnings transparency on the explanatory power of the returns-earnings relation, i.e., the extent to which earnings and
change in earnings covary contemporaneously with returns.
We ﬁnd that earnings transparency is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with cost of capital by showing that our
earnings transparency measure is negatively related to subsequent excess returns and differences in portfolio mean
subsequent returns incremental to the three Fama-French and momentum factors. These ﬁndings indicate that earnings
transparency captures dimensions of cost of capital that the factors do not. We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relation
between our earnings transparency measure and an estimate of expected cost of capital based on the four-factor model.
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However, we also ﬁnd that earnings transparency reﬂects information associated with expected cost of capital incremental
to that reﬂected in the fundamental risk characteristics underlying these factors. Inferences relating to the subsequent
excess and portfolio mean returns and expected cost of capital tests are robust to inclusion of explicit controls for leverage,
growth, and the magnitude of the earnings response coefﬁcient in the returns-earnings relation. The subsequent excess
and portfolio mean returns inferences are robust to including controls for changes in cash ﬂow and cash ﬂow risk. The
expected cost of capital inferences are robust to using a measure of expected cost of capital implied by analysts’ earnings
forecasts. Taken together, our ﬁndings provide evidence that ﬁrms with more transparent earnings enjoy a lower cost of
capital.Appendix A
A.1. Calculation of earnings transparency proxy
Eq. (1), repeated here as Eq. (A1), expresses TRANS as the sum of two measures, TRANSI and TRANSIN:
TRANSi,t  TRANSIj,tþTRANSINp,t : ðA1Þ
To calculate TRANSI, we estimate Eq. (A2):
RETi,j,t ¼ aI0þaI1Ei,j,t=Pi,j,t1þaI2DEi,j,t=Pi,j,t1þei,j,t : ðA2Þ
RET is annual return measured beginning three months after the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year end, Et=Pt1 is earnings before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations deﬂated by beginning of year price, and DE is change in earnings from
year t1 to year t.39 We estimate this model for 27 years (t¼1974,y, 2000) and for 15 industries, provided there are at
least 10 observations for that industry-year. This yields 396 separate industry components, TRANSIj,t . This estimation
procedure constrains the coefﬁcients in Eq. (A2), aI0, aI1, and aI2, to be the same for ﬁrms within industry j in year t.
To calculate TRANSIN, we estimate Eq. (A3):
RETi,p,t ¼ aIN0 þaIN1 Ei,p,t=Pi,p,t1þaIN2 DEi,p,t=Pi,p,t1þei,p,t : ðA3Þ
When estimating Eq. (A3), we place observations from each industry-year regression, i.e., Eq. (A2), into one of four
portfolios based on the magnitude of their associated residuals from each annual regression for that industry.40 We
estimate Eq. (A3) by year, pooling observations in portfolio p, p¼1,y, 4. This permits the industry-neutral component of
earnings transparency to vary over time. Because there are 27 years and 4 portfolios, we estimate 108 regressions,
obtaining 108 industry-neutral components, TRANSINp,t . This estimation procedure does not constrain the coefﬁcients in
Eq. (A3), aIN0 , aIN1 , and aIN2 , to be the same for ﬁrms within industry j in year t. Rather, it constrains ﬁrms within portfolio p to
have the same coefﬁcients in year t.
As an illustration, consider a hypothetical industry j, which has 100 observations per year. For each year, we rank the
100 residuals from 1 to 100 and place into portfolio 1 the 25 observations with the largest negative residuals, place into
portfolio 2 the observations with the next largest 25 residuals, and so on, until each observation is assigned to a portfolio.
We repeat this procedure for all 27 years and all 15 industries, so that portfolio 1 contains the quartile of observations with
the largest negative residuals from each of the 15 industries in each year, portfolio 2 contains the quartile of observations
with the next largest residuals from each of the 15 industries in each year, and so on. Thus, portfolios 1 and 4, which
contain the observations with the largest negative and largest positive residuals from the annual industry regressions,
comprise those ﬁrm-year observations for which the annual industry return regression model is least descriptive.
Selection of the optimal number of portfolios is an empirical matter reﬂecting a tradeoff between precision of
estimation and forcing otherwise different groups of ﬁrms to have the same earnings transparency measure. For example,
suppose instead of four portfolios we partitioned ﬁrms into eight portfolios, but ﬁrms in portfolios 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and
6, and 7 and 8 have identical earnings transparency. This would result in a loss of estimation efﬁciency compared with
partitioning ﬁrms into four portfolios, combining portfolios 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, and 7 and 8. In contrast, suppose
instead eight portfolios capture differences in earnings transparency, then partitioning ﬁrms into four portfolios masks the
cross-sectional earnings transparency differences.4139 Following Easton and Pae (2004), we also estimated versions of Eqs. (A2) and (A3) including year t1 dividends and the effects of other
comprehensive income. Untabulated ﬁndings indicate that none of our inferences is affected using this alternative speciﬁcation.
40 This procedure assumes that residuals of equal magnitude are equally informative about industry-neutral commonality regardless of the ﬁrm’s
industry regression standard error. To the extent that this procedure results in misclassifying ﬁrms across portfolios, our tests will be biased against
ﬁnding an association between TRANS and cost of capital.
41 Untabulated ﬁndings indicate that the signiﬁcance of the TRANS coefﬁcient in Eq. (2) is highest when we use four portfolios, although it is also
signiﬁcant for other numbers of portfolios.
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We calculate our proxy for each ﬁrm’s expected cost of capital for year tþ1 as of year t, ECCi,t , based on Eq. (A4):
ECCi,t ¼ Rf ,tþ b^RMRF,i,t  ðRMRf Þtþ b^SMB,i,t  SMBtþ b^HML,i,t  HMLtþ b^MOM,i,t MOMt , ðA4Þ
where b^RMRF,i,t ,b^SMB,i,t , b^HML,i,t , and b^MOM,i,t are ﬁrm-speciﬁc coefﬁcients estimated from Eq. (A5). ðRMRf Þt , SMBt , HMLt , and
MOMt are the expected annual Fama-French and momentum factor returns for year tþ1. We estimate the expected annual
factor returns by ﬁrst calculating each factor’s average monthly return over the 60 months prior to month m, and then
compounding the resulting average monthly returns over the twelve months prior to the beginning of ﬁrm i’s ﬁscal year.42
For each ﬁrm, we estimate the betas associated with the ﬁrm’s return to each of the factors by estimating the following
monthly time-series regression:
RETi,mRf ,m ¼ aiþbRMRF,iðRM,mRf ,mÞþbSMB,iSMBmþbHML,iHMLmþbMOM,iMOMmþei,m, ðA5Þ
where RETmRf ,m is the ﬁrm’s monthly return in excess of the risk-free rate, Rf,t. RM,mRf ,m is the monthly return of the
market portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate, HMLm and SMBm are the monthly returns to the book-to-market and size
factor mimicking portfolios as described in Fama and French (1993), and MOMm is the monthly return to the momentum
factor mimicking portfolio (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Carhart, 1997). We estimate Eq. (A5) using the most recent 60
months returns prior to the beginning of ﬁrm i’s ﬁscal year t. This results in estimated coefﬁcients, b^RMRF,i,t ,b^SMB,i,t , b^HML,i,t ,
and b^MOM,i,t that are updated annually.
References
Ang, A., Liu, J., 2004. How to discount cash ﬂows with time-varying expected returns. The Journal of Finance 59, 2745–2783.
Bailey, W., Karolyi, G.A., Salva, C., 2006. The economic consequences of increased disclosure: evidence from international cross-listings. Journal of
Financial Economics 81, 175–213.
Barth, M.E., Beaver, W.H., Landsman, W.R., 1998. Relative valuation roles of equity book value and net income as a function of ﬁnancial health. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 25, 1–34.
Barth, M.E., Beaver, W.H., Hand, J.M., Landsman, W.R., 1999. Accruals, cash ﬂows, and equity values. Review of Accounting Studies 4, 205–229.
Barth, M.E., Beaver, W.H., Hand, J.M., Landsman, W.R., 2005. Accruals, accounting-based valuation models, and the prediction of equity values. Journal of
Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 20, 311–345.
Barth, M.E., Hodder, L.D., Stubben, Stephen R., 2008. Fair value accounting for liabilities and own credit risk. The Accounting Review 83, 629–664.
Beatty, A., Ramesh, K., Weber, J., 2002. The importance of accounting changes in debt contracts: the cost of ﬂexibility in covenant calculations. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 29, 2005–2027.
Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., Welker, M., 2003. The world price of earnings opacity. The Accounting Review 78, 641–678.
Botosan, C.A., 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review 72, 323–349.
Botosan, C.A., Plumlee, M., 2002. A re-examination of disclosure level and expected cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research 40, 21–40.
Brennan, M.J., Subrahmanyam, A., 1996. Market microstructure and asset pricing: on the compensation for illiquidity in stock returns. Journal of Financial
Economics 41, 441–464.
Bushman, R., Chen, Q., Engel, E., Smith, A., 2004. Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems. Journal
of Accounting and Economics 37, 167–201.
Campbell, J.Y., Lettau, M., Malkiel, B.G., Xu, Y., 2001. Have individual stocks become more volatile? An empirical exploration of idiosyncratic risk. The
Journal of Finance 56, 1–43.
Carhart, M.M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of Finance 52, 57–82.
Claus, J., Thomas, J., 2001. Equity premia as low as three percent? Evidence from analysts’ earnings forecasts for domestic and international stock
markets. The Journal of Finance 56, 1629–1666.
Cochran, J.H., 2005. Asset Pricing. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Collins, D.W., Kothari, S., 1989. An analysis of intertemporal and cross-sectional determinants of earnings response coefﬁcients. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 11, 143–181.
Collins, D.W., Maydew, E.L., Weiss, I.S., 1997. Changes in the value-relevance of earnings and equity book values over the past forty years. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 24, 39–67.
Core, J.E., Guay, W.R., Verdi, R.S., 2008. Is accruals quality a priced risk factor? Journal of Accounting and Economics 46, 2–22.
Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C., Verdi, R., 2008. Mandatory IFRS reporting around the world: early evidence on the economic consequences. Journal of
Accounting Research 46, 1085–1142.
Dechow, P.M., Dichev, I.D., 2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77, 35–59.
Dhaliwal, D., Heitzman, S., Li, O.Z., 2007. Taxes, leverage, and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research 44, 691–723.
Diamond, D.W., Verrecchia, R.E., 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance 46, 1325–1359.
Easton, P.D., 2004. PE ratios, PEG ratios, and estimating the implied expected rate of return on equity capital. The Accounting Review 79, 73–95.
Easton, P., Harris, T., 1991. Earnings as an explanatory variable for return. Journal of Accounting Research 29, 19–36.
Easton, P., Monahan, S., 2005. An evaluation of accounting-based measures of expected returns. The Accounting Review 80, 501–538.
Easton, P., Pae, J., 2004. Accounting conservatism and the relation between returns and accounting data. Review of Accounting Studies 9, 495–521.
Ecker, F., Francis, J., Kim, I., Olsson, P.M., Schipper, K., 2006. A returns-based representation of earnings quality. The Accounting Review 81, 749–780.
Elton, E., 1999. Expected return, realized return, and asset pricing tests. The Journal of Finance 54, 1199–1220.
Fama, E.F., French., K.R., 1992. The cross-section of expected stock returns. The Journal of Finance 47, 427–465.
Fama, E.F., French., K.R., 1993. Common risk factors in the returns of stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3–56.
Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economics 43, 153–193.
Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 1998. Taxes, ﬁnancing decisions, and ﬁrm value. The Journal of Finance 53, 819–843.
Fama, E.F., French., K.R., 2002. The equity premium. The Journal of Finance 57, 637–659.
Fama, E.F., MacBeth, J.D., 1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: empirical tests. Journal of Political Economy 81, 607–636.42 Because ﬁve-year rolling windows may result in an outdated estimated risk-free rate, we calculate the expected monthly risk-free rate based on a
one-year rolling risk-free rate, updated monthly. The expected annual risk-free rate, R¯f,t, is obtained by compounding the expected monthly risk-free rate.
M.E. Barth et al. / Journal of Accounting and Economics 55 (2013) 206–224224Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1998. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133: Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging
Activities. Norwalk, CT.
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., Schipper, K., 2004. Costs of equity and earnings attributes. The Accounting Review 79, 967–1010.
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., Schipper, K., 2005. The market pricing of accruals quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 295–327.
Gebhardt, W.R., Lee, C.M.C., Swaminathan, B., 2001. Toward an implied cost of capital. Journal of Accounting Research 39, 135–176.
Gode, D., Mohanram, P., 2003. Inferring the cost of equity using the Ohlson-Juettner model. Review of Accounting Studies 8, 399–431.
Gode, D., Mohanram, P., 2008. Improving the Relationship Between Implied Cost of Capital and Realized Returns by Removing Predictable Analyst
Forecast Errors. Working Paper.
Gow, I.D., Ormazabal, G., Taylor, D.J., 2010. Correcting for cross-sectional and time-series dependence in accounting research. Accounting Review 85,
483–512.
Hail, L., Leuz, C., 2006. International differences in the cost of equity capital: do legal institutions and securities regulation matter? Journal of Accounting
Research 44, 485–532.
Healy, P., Hutton, A., Palepu, K., 1999. Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary
Accounting Research 16, 485–520.
Hughes, J., Liu, J., Liu, J., 2007. Information, diversiﬁcation, and cost of capital. The Accounting Review 82, 705–729.
Ibbotson Associates, 2005. In: Cost of Capital 2005 Yearbook Ibbotson Associates, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
Jagannathan, R., Wang, Z., 1996. The conditional CAPM and the cross-section of expected returns. The Journal of Finance 51, 3–53.
Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S., 1993. Returns to buying winners and selling losers: implications for stock market efﬁciency. The Journal of Finance 48, 65–91.
Johnston, J., 1984. Econometric Methods, 3rd edition McGraw-Hill, Inc..
Konchitchki, Y., 2011. Inﬂation and nominal ﬁnancial reporting: implications for performance and stock prices. The Accounting Review 86, 1045–1085.
Kothari, S., 2001. Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31, 105–231.
Kothari, S., Zimmerman, J., 1995. Price and return models. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20, 155–192.
Kyle, A.S., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53, 1315–1336.
Lambert, R., Leuz, C., Verrecchia, R., 2007. Accounting information, disclosure, and the cost of capital. Journal of Accounting Research 45, 385–420.
Lang, M., Lundholm, R., 2000. Voluntary disclosure and equity offerings: reducing information uncertainty or hyping the stock. Contemporary Accounting
Research 17, 623–662.
Lettau, M., Ludvigson, S., 2001. Resurrecting the (C)CAPM: a cross-sectional test when risk premia are time-varying. Journal of Political Economy 109,
1238–1287.
Leuz, C., 2003. IAS versus U.S. GAAP: information asymmetry-based evidence from Germany’s new market. Journal of Accounting Research 41, 445–472.
Leuz, C., Verrecchia, R.E., 2000. The economic consequences of increased disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research 38, 91–124.
Lev, B., 1989. On the usefulness of earnings and earnings research: lessons and directions from two decades of empirical research. Journal of Accounting
Research 27, 153–192.
Massa, M., Peyer, U., Tong, Z., 2005. Limits of Arbitrage and Corporate Financial Policy. Working Paper.
McInnis, J., 2010. Earnings smoothness, average returns, and implied equity cost of capital. The Accounting Review 85, 315–341.
Mendenhall, R.R., 2004. Arbitrage risk and post-earnings-announcement drift. Journal of Business 77, 875–894.
Minton, B., Schrand, C., 1999. The impact of cash ﬂow volatility on discretionary investment and the costs of debt and equity ﬁnancing. Journal of
Financial Economics 54, 423–460.
Mohanram, P., Rajgopal, S., 2009. Is PIN priced? Journal of Accounting and Economics 47, 226–243.
Ohlson, J., 1995. Earnings, book values and dividends in security valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research 11, 661–687.
Petersen, M.A., 2009. Estimating standard errors in ﬁnance panel data sets: comparing approaches. Review of Financial Studies 22, 435–480.
Petkova, R., 2006. Do the Fama-French proxy for innovations in predictive variables? The Journal of Finance 61, 581–612.
Rouwenhorst, K.G., 1998. International momentum strategies. The Journal of Finance 53, 267–284.
Schipper, K., Thompson, R., 1983. The impact of merger-related regulations on the shareholders of acquiring ﬁrms. Journal of Accounting Research 21,
184–221.
Sengupta, P., 1998. Corporate disclosure policy and the cost of debt. The Accounting Review 73, 459–474.
Vuolteenaho, T., 2002. What drives ﬁrm-level stock returns? The Journal of Finance 57, 233–264.
Welker, M., 1995. Disclosure policy, information asymmetry and liquidity in equity markets. Contemporary Accounting Research 11, 801–828.
Xu, Y., Malkiel, B.G., 2003. Investigating the behavior of idiosyncratic volatility. Journal of Business 76, 613–644.
Zhang, L., 2005. The value premium. The Journal of Finance 60, 67–103.
Zellner, A., 1962. An efﬁcient method for estimating seemingly unrelated regressions and tests for aggregation bias. Journal of the American Statistical
Association 57, 348–368.
